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YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS AND ADULT COURTS:
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION vs. JUVENILE RIGHTS
Despite the much-commented-upon shortcomings of the juvenile
justice system,' a youth often finds it to his advantage to be proceeded
against as a juvenile rather than as an adult. Under virtually all state
2
and federal3 statutes, a youth found delinquent by a juvenile or family
court can be incarcerated only until his twenty-first birthday, cannot
be mixed in jail with adult offenders, does not face the loss of civil
rights after incarceration, and does not have an arrest or conviction
placed permanently on his record for possible use in future sentencing
or for possible disqualification from future public employment-in
short, is entitled to a far better opportunity for rehabilitation than the
convicted adult.4 Accordingly, the criteria according to which youths
are selected for prosecution as juveniles rather than as adults are of
vital significance to affected youths.
If a state sets a reasonable age, such as eighteen, as a dividing
line between adult and juvenile status, and prosecutes only those over
eighteen as adults, there seems to be no serious constitutional flaw in
the selection process.5 However, many states and the federal govern-
ment have enacted statutes which differentiate among youths of the
same age.' The apparent rationale of such statutes is that, weighing
society's need for protection against the benefit a youth might derive
from special rehabilitative treatment, some youths of one age group
should be given an opportunity to benefit from juvenile treatment,
while other youths of the same age are too incorrigible to respond to
such treatment, and if mixed with the former group would only impede
1 See, e.g., Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System: Problems of
Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 7.
2 See, e.g., PA. STAT. AwNr. tit. 11, §§ 243-45, 256, 261 (1965).
3 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-37 (1970).
4 See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556-57 (1966). See also Kemplen v.
Maryland, 428 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1970), in which the petitioner had already served his
sentence but nonetheless sought a writ of habeas corpus, seeking to remove his criminal
conviction from his record on the grounds that he should have been proceeded against
as a juvenile.
Treatment as a juvenile may, however, result in severe disadvantages. The most
famous witness to such disadvantages is Gerald Gault, who was committed for six
years-the duration of his minority-for an act for which an adult could have been
sentenced to a maximum of two months. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
5 A cutoff line set at age 16 would also seem constitutionally unassailable, although
one might argue that-given the avowed rehabilitative purposes of juvenile courts-
such a youthful cutoff would be impermissibly arbitrary, or that Kent v. United States,
383 U.S. 541 (1966), constitutionalzed a cutoff at 18, see notes 9-16 infra & accom-
panying text. This Comment proceeds upon the assumption that such a lowering of
the cutoff line would comport with due process requirements. Cf. note 30 infra.
6 For a comprehensive treatment of statutes concerning transfers from juvenile to
adult courts, see Mountford & Berenson, Waiver of Jurisdiction: The Last Resort of the
Juvenile Court, 18 U. Kts. L. REv. 55 (1969).
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efforts at reform. 7 Given the wide variations in our dual systems of
justice,' there arises a serious constitutional question as to what pro-
cedural standards must be observed in deciding whether a youthful
offender will be accorded juvenile or adult status.
In Kent v. United States9 the Supreme Court examined a District
of Columbia statute that allowed a family court judge to transfer
jurisdiction of any youth between sixteen and eighteen to the adult
court after "full investigation."'" Without such a transfer, a youth
would be treated as a juvenile; with the transfer, he would enter the
adult court system. In construing the statute,1 the Kent Court-
without pausing to look to legislative history or other parts of the
statutory scheme-interpreted "full investigation" to require that
there be a hearing at which the youth would be represented by coun-
sel, 2 that all social records relied upon by the judge be available to
the youth's attorney, and that the judge issue a written statement of
his findings. Because it seems clear beyond doubt that the court was
deliberately interpreting the statute to sidestep possible constitutional
infirmities,13 the ultimate relevance of the decision may have initially
been uncertain.' 4 However, any doubt that Kent established a constitu-
tional principle should have been effectively removed by the language
and holding in In re Gault,'5 in which the Court held that assistance
of counsel at waiver proceedings was required by due process. Most
subsequent courts have thus interpreted Kent and Gault, taken to-
gether, as establishing minimum constitutional rights of juveniles at
waiver hearings.'"
7See Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 334, 343 (4th Cir. 1973).
8As one judge phrased it:
The Family Court is more than just another judicial body; it is another system
of justice with different procedures, a different penalty structure, and a different
philosophy of rehabilitation.
United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (J. Skelly Wright, J., dis-
senting), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 2294 (1973).
9 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
10See id. at 547; D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1553 (1967).
11 To construe the statute, the Court was forced to depart from its usual practice
of not interpreting local statutes for the District of Columbia. See 383 U.S. at 568 (dis-
senting opinion).
12For an explanation of the Court's precise holding as to appointment of counsel,
see note 48 infra.
13 The Court observed that it had not in the past "deferred to decisions on local
law where to do so would require adjudication of difficult constitutional questions." 383
U.S. at 557 n.27.
14 Compare Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile
Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. RFv. 167, Wth Comment, Criminal Offenders in the Juvenile Court:
More Brickbats and Another Proposal, 114 U. PA. L. Rxv. 1171 (1966).
15387 U.S. 1 (1967). The Court noted that although its decision in Kent turned
upon statutory language, it had emphasized "the necessity that the basic requirements
of due process and fairness be satisfied in such proceedings." Id. at 12, quoting Kent V.
United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966). Later, it reiterated as a constitutional require-
ment the Kent view that a waiver hearing must meet due process standards. 387 U.S.
at 30-31.
16 See Powell v. Hocker, 453 F.2d 652, 654 (9th Cir. 1971). For an exhaustive col-
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If, indeed, Kent was constitutionally based, identical or similar
requirements of procedural due process should remain applicable if a
prosecutor, rather than a judge, is charged with determining whether
a youthful offender is to be classified as a juvenile or as an adult. A
youth's right to juvenile treatment would seem unaffected by a change
in decisionmakers; the impact of classification on him is the same,
regardless of which public official is responsible.
The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in 1969 to con-
sider related issues 17 but dismissed the appeal. 8 In Cox v. United
States,'9 however, the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, confronted the
issue. Reversing a three-judge panel, it held constitutional a statute
which allowed the Attorney General to determine-without benefit
of a hearing-whether a youth alleged to have violated a "law of the
United States not punishable by death or life imprisonment °20 should
be treated as a juvenile or as an adult. In so doing, the court reaffirmed
its prior holding in Kemplen v. Maryland"' that a juvenile court could
not transfer jurisdiction of a youth without a hearing, at which the
youth was represented by counsel. Nonetheless, it distinguished a sim-
ilar prosecutorial decision of identical effect, noting that "[e]ffects...
are not the sole measure of the reach of the Bill of Rights"22 and rea-
soning that prosecutorial discretion has traditionally been unencum-
bered by due process requirements. It concluded that the prosecutor's
decision whether to prosecute an offender as an adult is analytically
comparable to typical charging decisions which, in the absence of in-
vidious discrimination, are within his unrestrained discretion.2 4 The
court indicated that as long as Congress might reasonably delegate to
lection of relevant cases, see United States ex rel. Turner v. Rundle, 438 F.2d 839, 842
n.11 (3d Cir. 1971).
17DeBacker v. Brainard, 393 U.S. 1076 (1969).
18396 U.S. 28 (1969). The case presented the issue of the constitutionality of un-
restrained prosecutorial discretion to classify youthful offenders. The Court dismissed
the appeal, in part because none of the lower state courts that heard the case passed
specifically on the issue. Id. at 32.
For another cursory pre-Kent resolution of the issue, see United States v. Verra,
203 F. Supp. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
19473 F.2d 334 (4th Cir. 1973).
20 The statute reads, in pertinent part:
A juvenile alleged to have committed one or more acts in violation of a law
of the United States not punishable by death or life imprisonment, and not sur-
rendered to the authorities of a state, shall be proceeded against as a juvenile
delinquent if he consents to such procedure, unless the Attorney General, in his
discretion, has expressly directed otherwise.
18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1970).
21428 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1970). The court's decision rested upon the right to
counsel, as well as upon due process grounds. This Comment deals only with the due
process argument.
22473 F.2d at 336.2 3 Id. The Cox court thus chose to ignore the contrast between a decision to try
a youthful offender as an adult and other, more typical, prosecutorial decisions; as well
as the tradition that waiver decisions are not for prosecutors. See id. at 341 (majority
opinion of three-judge panel).
24 See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
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the Attorney General the determination of the youtf's status, the
youth would have no right to a hearing.
The same issue-whether a prosecutor must comply with due
process in determining a youthful offender's adult status-was pre-
sented with only a slightly different twist in United States v. Bland.2V 5
There, the statute involved 26 was an amended version of the statute
interpreted by the Supreme Court in Kent,2 7 and represented a clear
effort to avoid the mandates of Kent and avert the necessity of a hear-
ing. s It thus defined a juvenile as any youth under eighteen-with the
exception of a youth over sixteen charged by the prosecutor with any
of a list of serious felonies 29 Whether a youth would be deemed
juvenile or adult would depend solely on the initial charge, regardless
of the eventual verdict. As long as there existed probable cause to
charge a youth with any of the listed felonies, the prosecutor, by choos-
ing between that charge and a lesser offense, would have discretion in
determining whether or not the youth would be prosecuted as an adult,
without the guidance of the hearing which Kent found constitutionally
required of a judge.
30
25472 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 2294 (1973).
2 6 D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2301(3)(A) (Supp. V, 1972).
2 7 D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1553 (1967).
28 The evasion seems to have been remarkably successful. The majority of the
court failed to address itself to Kent's holding anywhere in the body of its opinion.
See 472 F.2d at 1339 n.1 (J. Skelly Wright, J., dissenting).
29 The statute reads, in pertinent part:
(3) The term "child" means an individual who is under 18 years of age, except
that the term "child" does not include an individual who is sixteen years of age
or older and-
(A) charged by United States attorney with (i) murder, forcible rape, bur-
glary in the first degree, robbery while armed, or assault with intent to commit
any such offense, or (ii) an offense listed in clause (i) and any other offense
properly joinable with such an offense;
(B) charged with an offense referred to in subparagraph (A)(i) and con-
victed by plea or verdict of a lesser included offense ....
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2301(3) (Supp. V, 1972).
30 Since a prosecutor cannot be presumed to be more capable of arriving at a
correct classification decision than a judge, the statutes considered in Bland and Cox,
like that disapproved in Kent, deprive youthful offenders of individualized consideration
of their disposition and ability to be rehabilitated. Classification by charge, as in Bland,
is made particularly objectionable by its reversal of the traditional presumption of
innocence. See 472 F.2d at 1337-38.
Allowing unbridled prosecutorial discretion creates the maximum possibility of ir-
rational application of the statute. The prosecutor will be able to selectively forgive
youths accused of felonies, without even the benefit of the relevant information pro-
vided by a simple due process hearing. Moreover, the legislative history of the Bland
statute demonstrates fairly conclusively that even if the Attorney General charges the
youth with one of the enumerated crimes and then refuses to prosecute, the juvenile
court can then take jurisdiction. H.R. RP. No. 907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1970). This
fact was noted by the lower court, United States v. Bland, 330 F. Supp. 34, 36 (D.D.C.
1971), and by judge Wright in dissent, 472 F.2d at 1341 n.2, but was ignored by the
Bland majority.
The arbitrariness of this scheme is not diminished by the observation that a state
may elect to set an inflexible dividing line between adult and juvenile status at 16, and
thus sweep rehabilitable youths into the adult system. Most significantly, such a scheme
would not be subject to abusive exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The fact that a
benefit need not be made available by the legislature in the first instance is no excuse for
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A District of Columbia Circuit majority found it consistent with
Kent to hold the Bland statute constitutional. Like the Fourth Circuit
in Cox, it placed the prosecutor's determination within the category
of prosecutorial discretion. As added justification for its conclusion, it
reasoned that a youth between sixteen and eighteen is neither a juve-
nile nor an adult until charged, and thus is not divested of a right or
privilege when charged with one of the enumerated felonies, since
there exists no transfer of jurisdiction to which the procedural guide-
lines of Kent could apply.
Thus, the Supreme Court's subsequent denial of Bland's petition
for a writ of certiorari represented a quiet sidestepping of large and
substantial constitutional questions concerning the proper scope of
prosecutorial discretion and the proper safeguards to be accorded to
the juvenile status of a youthful offender.31
I. PROSECUTORIAL DIsCRETION
Because of practical limitations on prosecutorial resources, and
because no statute or manual can possibly guide a prosecutor to fair
results in all conceivable charging situations, there has emerged a tra-
dition favoring broad prosecutorial discretion. Courts have reasoned
that, so long as probable cause links a defendant with a crime, the
defendant has no right not to be charged.32 Therefore, a prosecutor is
allowed virtually unrestrained choice in his decision whether to prose-
cute,3 under what statute to prosecute,3" and whether to accept a
denying a prospective beneficiary an adequate determination of his entitlement to it
when the possibility does exist. See notes 41-42 infra & accompanying text.
While an age-based classification provides an arbitrary cutoff for juvenile juris-
diction, it at least is supported by the weight of tradition. Moreover, even if a state
could theoretically lower the juvenile line to age 16 and thus sweep in more rehabilitable
offenders, the harsh effect on rehabilitable youths makes that step unlikely.
If the Bland statute were to force a prosecutor to prosecute as adults all offenders
chargeable with felonies, the constitutional vice currently inherent in the statute might be
reduced or eliminated. Again, this new provision would result in increased harshness
toward youthful offenders, and might run counter to the rehabilitative goais of the
juvenile justice system. As a practical matter, however, this very harshness would make
a state consider carefully before taking such a measure given the impact it might have
on defendants a prosecutor might wish to favor.
For another unreasonable legislative classification, see Long v. Robinson, 436 F.2d
1116 (4th Cir. 1971), aff'g 316 F. Supp. 22 (D. Md. 1970) (juvenile status turned on
whether youth came from urban area).
31 Bland v. United States, 93 S. Ct. 2294 (1973) (Douglas, Brennan, & Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting).
32 See, e.g., Beauregard v. Wingard, 362 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1966).
33 See Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
906 (1966).
3 4 See, e.g., Hutcherson v. United States, 345 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 894 (1965). In Hutcherson, the prosecutor had a choice of prosecuting under two
separate statutes. His choice largely determined the sentence of the defendant, as there
was a wide variance in the statutory penalties. Yet the court found no greater usurpa-
tion of the judicial sentencing function than that normally inherent in a prosecutor's
selection of charges, and rejected dissenting judge Bazelon's attempt to bridle prose-
cutorial discretion by importing charging guidelines.
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guilty plea to a lesser crime.35 Selective enforcement is improper only
if based on an "unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other
arbitrary classification,"3 and a defendant must make out a prima
facie case of invidious discrimination before a court will review the
prosecutor's decision3 7 Prosecuting a defendant because of his radical
leanings 38 or intensively investigating a defendant suspected of a role
in organized crime in an unrelated matter39 have been held valid exer-
cises of discretion. While giving full scope to this doctrine, it is impor-
tant to remember that such discretion, properly considered, is merely
the expression of administrative necessity and not a distinct substantive
or procedural right of the prosecutor. It negates the assertion that any
particular charging decision is unlawful due to arbitrariness or im-
proper motive, and expresses the court's nonrecognition of any coun-
tervailing interest of the defendant in the decision per se; but it should
not be construed to override other independent rights of the defendant.
In both Bland and Cox, the courts held that the prosecutor's de-
termination whether to treat a youth as an adult is a similar matter
properly within prosecutorial discretion. To hold it within prosecutorial
discretion to charge a defendant with a lesser offense than that for
which there is probable cause means that the defendant has no right
protected by the guarantees of due process or equal protection to be
charged with that lesser offense; to hold that the determination whether
a youth should be prosecuted as an adult is within prosecutorial dis-
cretion means that the youth has no right to be treated as a juvenile.
Prosecutorial discretion is not in itself a factor merely to be balanced
against other things; instead, it is a conclusion contrary to the con-
clusion that a due process right exists. 0 Similarly, a finding that a right
35 See, e.g., Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
36 Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).
37See, e.g., People v. Gray, 254 Cal. App. 2d 256, 265-67, 63 Cal. Rptr. 211, 217-18
(1967).
It has been argued that prosecutorial discretion is constitutionally mandated by the
grant of law enforcement power to the executive branch, U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 3. See
United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171-72 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965).
But limited judicial review solely for the purpose of determining whether equal protec-
tion has been denied would not seem to interfere with legitimate executive discretion.
See Bland v. United States, 93 S. Ct. 2294 (1973) (Douglas, Brennan & Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting); K. DAvis, DiSCRTIONARY JUSTICE 188-214 (1969). See also Hutcherson v.
United States, 345 F.2d 964, 970, 975-77 (D.C. Cir.) (Bazelon, J., concurring and dis-
senting), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 894 (1965).
38 See, e.g., Dear Wing Jung v. United States, 312 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1963).
39 See, e.g., United States v. Socco, 428 F.2d 264, 271 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 903 (1970).
4oThere is considerable semantic difficulty at this point. One might reasonably say
that a matter is properly within a prosecutor's discretion, provide for only scant review
of his decisions, and still require that he comply with certain standards in reaching his
decision. Thus, "prosecutorial discretion" and defendants' rights would not be anti-
thetical, but fully reconcilable. This was essentially the view of the Cox three-judge panel
and Justice Wright's Bland dissent. See 473 F.2d at 341: "We emphasize that our deci-
sion does not rest on the [conclusion] that this is not a prosecutorial decision"; 472 F.2d
at 1342: "The issue . . . is not whether the prosecutor should be permitted to make
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to a due process hearing exists would negate the validity of overriding
discretion. And while one may have no right not to be charged or to be
charged with a particular offense, juvenile status is a privilege con-
ferred by statute.
Privileges granted by the government have been recently pro-
tected from arbitrary divestment.41 Just as Kent and Gault protect
juvenile status from judicial divestment, the Supreme Court has ex-
plicitly held in Goldberg v. Kelly42 that a welfare recipient has a prop-
erty interest in continued benefits which so outweighs governmental
interests in administrative efficiency that even a temporary suspension
of benefits must comport with due process. A youth's interest in juve-
nile treatment-with its obviously significant implications for his
liberty-is as much within the protection of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments as is the welfare recipient's property interest in continued
benefits.
According to the majority's analysis in Bland, however, the right
to be proceeded against as a juvenile does not vest until the prosecutor
has made his decision: a youth between sixteen and eighteen is neither
an adult nor a juvenile until charged by the prosecutor.43 In Kent, on
the other hand, the judge was divesting a youth already defined as a
juvenile of the resultant privileges. This suggested distinction between
the cases becomes more plausible if within the relevant age group
juvenile status is the exception, adult treatment the rule; it might then
follow that a correct analogy is not between cessation of juvenile status
and loss of welfare benefits, but between denial of juvenile status and
denial of an initial application for welfare benefits.
If, however, the raison d'9tre of the juvenile justice system is to
make special provision for youths unsophisticated in crime and re-
habilitable by special treatment-and it is devilishly hard to devise
an alternate rationale-then it would seem wholly irrelevant whether
juvenile status had "vested," or whether few youths of the age were
waiver decisions, but . . .how he should go about making those decisions" (footnote
omitted).
Unfortunately, perhaps for the very reason that other cases involving "prosecu-
torial discretion" have not involved clashes between discretion and cognizable rights of
the defendant, the Cox and Bland majorities use the term as necessarily antithetical to
due process hearing requirements.
41 For a compelling argument that a constitutional distinction between "rights" and
"privileges," invoked in the past to preclude individuals in the public sector from pro-
tecting themselves against arbitrary governmental action, is illogical and no longer
viable, see Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Prizilege Distinction in Constitu-
tional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
42397 U.S. 254 (1970). See also Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
43 The Cox court could have reached an identical result by saying that Cox became an
adult or juvenile only after the Attorney General determined which he was.
It may be observed that Judge Wright, in dissent, adopts the majority's reasoning
and still finds a divestiture under the Bland statute. 472 F.2d at 1343-44. But it is largely
immaterial whether Judge Wright was correct, for statutory amendments could clearly
eliminate the divestiture. It is more important to note the basic irrelevance of the
divestiture argument,
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accorded that status. The youth's all-important disposition to be helped
remains the same whether he is legally classified as adult, juvenile, or
something in between. If the legislative classification does not preclude
treating the youth as a juvenile, then, irrespective of legal labels, he
should be entitled to the elements of due process before being classified
as an adult.
This conclusion seems confirmed by the suggested welfare analogy.
Although nothing in the majority opinion in Goldberg makes it clear
that one has a right to due process when initially applying for welfare
benefits, the dissent to a companion case raised the possibility.44
Initial applications for public housing45 and liquor licenses40 have been
held within the scope of due process. There seems no logical reason
why juvenile status is a lesser privilege not entitled to similar protec-
tions, to be overridden by a need for prosecutorial discretion. Finally,
even if a distinction between discontinuance and denial of a benefit
may reasonably be implied in areas-such as welfare-where the
"vesting" of a right may be thought to generate a form of reliance or
dependence, no such distinction is rational in the situations under dis-
cussion. Whether juvenile status is conferred in a judge's discretion
or automatically, subject to divestment, its real benefits attach only
with the commencement of judicial proceedings. Bland and Kent are
indistinguishable in this regard. The relevant question, thus, is not
whether due process requirements should apply to determination of
juvenile status, but merely what form they should take.
II. CONTOURS OF DUE PROCESS
The Kent court mandated procedural due process, yet in no way
indicated what had to be shown or examined at such a hearing47 De-
spite this silence, it has been assumed that the relevant fact to be
examined is the likelihood of rehabilitating the youth, balanced against
society's need for protection.48 It is more difficult, however, to conclude
what exact procedural trappings are required by due process.
Kent included among the requisites of due process that a youth
44 Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280, 284-85 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
4 5 Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1968).
The court admonished that "due process requires that selections among applicants [for
public housing] be made in accordance with 'ascertainable standards." (quoting Hornsby
v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 612 (5th Cir. 1964)).
4 GHornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964) (rejecting the argument that,
since sales of liquor were deemed a privilege, the licensing authority had unreviewable
discretion to grant or deny licenses).
4 7This paradox is noted in Comment, Criminal Offenders in the Juvenile Court:
More Brickbats and Another Proposal, 114 U. PA. L. RPv. 1171 (1966).
4 8 See Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile
Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 167, 182. The three-judge panel in Cox also determined, on
the basis of legislative history (though without any specific references), that a transfer
hearing must weigh a youth's best interests against the interests of society. 473 F.2d at
342. Cf. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
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have an attorney or have one appointed for him,49 that there be a
hearing, that the attorney have access to all records before the court,
and that there be written findings sufficient for a reviewing court to
find that there had been a full investigation.5 ° These requirements,
however, were all predicated upon the assumption that the waiver
determination would be made by a judge. Can a determination by a
prosecutor be made consistent with due process? If so, must the re-
quirements be changed?
There seems to be no reason why a prosecutor cannot make a
waiver determination in accordance with due process. Before its deci-
sion was vacated by the court en banc, the three-judge panel in Cox
had so held; and Goldberg v. Kelly offers additional precedent for the
assertion that the Attorney General or his delegate possesses sufficient
impartiality for due process purposes. While indicating that an impar-
tial decisionmaker was imperative to determine whether the cessation
of welfare benefits was justified,5 Goldberg held that a superior official
in the welfare administration-even one previously involved in the
present case, so long as he had not participated in making the decision
under review-would be an acceptable decisionmaker.
The Goldberg holding is not exact precedent, because a court
might well require greater safeguards in a hearing affecting personal
liberty than in one which involves property interests,5 but may none-
theless be persuasive. It does seem clear, however, that even conceding
the decisionmaking to the Attorney General's office, the prosecuting
attorney himself could not be final arbiter in a hearing to determine
the youth's status, for he would have made the initial decision to
prosecute the youth and thus could scarcely qualify as impartial.
The three-judge panel in Cox did not require a hearing, finding it
sufficient for due process purposes that a copy of the request for adult
prosecution be given to the youth and his counsel, that they be given
an opportunity to write a rebuttal letter, and that the prosecutor's
decision be reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act.5 3 It
is uncertain whether these requirements would suffice; for Goldberg
explicitly stressed the importance of a hearing with confrontation and
cross-examination of witnesses,54 and Kent, while silent on the issue
4 9 Because Morris Kent had his own attorney, the Court's requirement that an
attorney be appointed is, strickly speaking, only dictum. Yet it seems crystal clear from
Kent and Gault that counsel is now required. See Schornhorst, The Waiver of Juvenile
Court Jurisdiction: Kent Revisited, 43 IND. L.J. 583 (1968).
Go t seems a reasonable assumption that these are constitutionally mandated. See
notes 9-16 supra & accompanying text.
51 Cf. Jones v. Robinson, 440 F.2d 249 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (establishing due process
requisites for mental patients accused of crime, including a requirement that wherever
possible the decisionmaker have no prior connection with the incident at hand).
521n the words of the Court in Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971), "[P]ro-
cedures adequate to determine a welfare claim may not suffice to try a felony charge."
535 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (1970).
54397 U.S. at 271.
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of confrontation of witnesses, also required a hearing. Whether a
hearing is always required in juvenile status determinations, is unclear;
it might only be absolutely required when, as in Cox, a distant official
in the Justice Department, unfamiliar with the case, is making the
determination. It does seem clear, however, that if one takes seriously
the premises fundamental to the juvenile justice system-that the
juvenile courts exist for the benefit of rehabilitable youthful of-
fenders--due process requires that a prosecutor's discretion to select
offenders for adult treatment be checked by whatever procedures will
guarantee individual examination of a defendant's disposition.
III. CONCLUSION
The recent decisions in Cox and Bland expand the concept of
prosecutorial discretion, and allow a significant privilege of a re-
habilitable youthful offender to be overridden by a doctrine developed
for prosecutorial convenience. In so doing, the cases allow evasion of
the seemingly clear mandates of Kent, and ignore important due proc-
ess protections established in Goldberg.
The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Bland suggests an
unfortunate unwillingness to confront substantial constitutional ques-
tions. It must be hoped that in time the Court will end its silence, con-
front this clash between prosecutorial discretion and the rights of
offenders, and prevent a doctrine aimed at ensuring prosecutorial fair-
ness and flexibility from shielding potentially arbitrary and inequitable
handling of juvenile offenders.
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